Newsday - August 2, 1999
Laurie Garrett - Staff Writer

Unlike nuclear physics, bomb engineering and cryptography, biology has never been subjected to the kind of security limitations that mandate Justice Department approval prior to discussion with foreign scientists or before publication of scientific results. And biologists fear that any obstacles to discussion and international research collaboration will slow the pace of medical and public health discovery.

"That's the way things are trending," said a top U.S. government intelligence expert, speaking about tightened security. "It's really a chill that will descend on . . . normal scientific exchanges," said the expert, who asked not to be identified.

At the forefront of such discussion is the Department of Energy, which has been under scrutiny from congressional leaders over allegations of security breaches at its Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. Last month the laboratory underwent a two-day "stand-down," during which all of its scientists and support employees were required to undergo FBI training regarding new security measures and the threat of espionage. Similar stand-downs have been, or soon will be, executed at all DOE laboratories, including Brookhaven National Laboratory in Upton.

On July 14, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson issued tough new guidelines, further limiting the candor of all national laboratory scientists - including biologists. In his memo to all DOE employees, Richardson said that, "despite the interest of science in a free flow of information, from now on foreign national visits and assignments will be closely monitored so that they are consistent with United States foreign nonproliferation, international energy and national security policies and agreements."

Today, the National Academy of Sciences will begin two days of debate in Washington over expanded national security measures.

Dr. Bruce Alberts, director of the academy, said, "It would be obviously disastrous to screen out foreign scientists - a third of all biologists in these laboratories are from foreign countries. We're safer if we allow free science."

The academy, the nation's most prestigious scientific organization, has analyzed the impact of prior security sweeps, including the Reagan administration's imposition of pre-publication FBI clearance on cryptography papers. It has consistently found that such measures failed to prevent information from getting into the hands of enemies, but has blocked legitimate science. In the case of cryptography, efforts to limit that field of mathematics to protect U.S. computer codes collapsed amid feverish private sector research and development. Biology, which has similar pressures, particularly from the biotech industry, could face a similar fate.

Few scientists have voiced any dispute with DOE's new measures when applied to nuclear physics and weapons design. But since 1991 and the end of the Cold War, DOE has greatly expanded nonweapons research in its facilities.

Los Alamos, for example, holds the world's largest repository of human and microbial genetic sequences. Every known genetic sequence of the AIDS virus is stored in Los Alamos computers and is accessible to researchers worldwide. Similarly, that lab's computers contain the genetic data being amassed by the Human Genome Project, which involves thousands of scientists from all over the world collaborating to sequence the entire human DNA set. Some of the best epidemic modelers, who apply mathematics and epidemiology to study disease outbreak scenarios, are working in DOE labs.

"Enhanced security measures are not intended to negatively impact open science research and collaboration," Richardson told Newsday. "As is the case with any program that is in the process of being implemented, there may be bumps in the road and unforeseen consequences. The department will be closely monitoring all aspects of the security enhancement program and is prepared to consider making adjustments where appropriate."

Other agencies that fund biology research are similarly considering or developing security guidelines that would place limits on some public discussion and publication of biology research results. None would provide details, but the Departments of Defense and Commerce are examining the issue. So far, these concerns have not reached the Department of Health and Human Services' researchers working within the National Institutes of Health or funded by those institutes, according to Dr. Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases.

But, "People are really getting nervous about it," one top epidemics researcher who asked not to be further identified said. "All I know is that people are tense. They say, `What does this mean for us?' "

Biology was not on the original target list for congressional scrutiny, according to staffers on Capitol Hill who played a role in the Cox Commission investigation earlier this year, led by Rep. Christopher Cox (R-Calif.). That commission ignited the new security concern, alleging that Taiwan-born physicist Wen Ho Lee leaked nuclear weapons information to China from his lab inside Los Alamos. Lee was fired in March, but has not been charged with a crime.

Dr. Joshua Lederberg, the Nobel Prize-winning Rockefeller University biologist who has been a prominent voice of concern about biological weapons, said in an interview that, "there are a few things at the margins [of biology research] that I would wince at having publicly known . . . But how to maintain that without creating a police state is hard to know."

Dr. Margaret Hamburg, former New York City commissioner of health and now assistant secretary of Health and Human Services, agreed, in principle, noting that, "there certainly is a sense that we have to think of the implications of certain types of biology research."

But one of the nation's top experts on biological weapons, Dr. D.A. Henderson of the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense in Baltimore, said he "would be greatly concerned by actions which would seriously restrict the general flow of information."

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